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THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE CONSTRUC-
TION OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS
J. B. FORDIAM*
The prospect of the extension -by the federal courts of the doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson' to uniform state laws merits serious attention.
The application of that familiar doctrine, that in cases of diverse
citizenship governed by state common law, federal courts will deter-
mine questions of so-called "general jurisprudence" on their inde-
pendent judgment and are not bound by state decisions, has already
given rise to a body of federal-made state common law.2 Should it
be extended into the realm of state statutory law?
If the theory of some of the lower federal courts is correct the
movement for uniform state laws has opened a large new field for
the application of the doctrine. That theory is that in construing
state statutes which are merely declaratory of the general commer-
cial law the federal courts are no more bound to follow state court
decisions construing those statutes than they would -be to follow local
decisions on such law before it was codified by statute. It is well
known that most of the uniform state laws, and particularly those
most widely adopted, are in Jarge part codifications with some changes,
of so-called "general commercial" law.3 Reference to the cases re-
veals that the question has not yet confronted the Supreme Court.
But, interesting to note, the judge who was among the first to approve
the notion is now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In Byrne v.
Kansas City, F. S. and M. R. Co.4 Judge Taft voiced the dictum
that a state statute as to the effect of contributory negligence when
pleaded to a statutory cause of action, if declared by the state court to
be simply declaratory of the common law, was to be construed inde-
pendently by the federal courts.
In 1907 the federal district court for the eastern district of
Georgia flatly disregarded the Georgia court's construction of a
Georgia statute and adopted a contrary one on the grounds that
the statute was merely a codification of general commercial law
* Student Editor-in-Chief, NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW.
'16 Pet. 1 (1842).
'This result is too familiar to require citation. For a recent example see
Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co., infra note 34.
E. g., the N. I. L. and the Uniform Sales Act.
' 61 Fed. 605 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894).
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and that the local court's construction was erroneous, amounting
to an amendment of the statute.5 The case involved the ques-
tion whether the statute rendered it unessential to the validity of
an assignment of a policy of life insurance that the assignee have
an insurable interest. No other decision has been found where a
federal court has placed upon a state statute a construction directly
contrary to that of the state court, because of the doctrine of Swift
v. Tyson. However, there are other assertions of the view, largely
in the field of bills and notes.
In a case decided in 1923 the federal district court for the eastern
district of Oklahoma was called upon to construe sections 1 and 2
of the Negotiable Instruments Law.6 It appeared that in the latest
c2se in point before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, the construc-
tion of the sections favored by the federal court had been adopted.7
The federal court went on to declare, however, that since the sections
were simply codifications of the common law-merchant it was not
bound by the construction followed by the state court, whatever it
might be. And a similar assertion has since 'been made by a federal
court sitting in Iowa in a case where that conclusion was not neces-
sary to the decision.8
Such dicta and the decision in the case of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Lane9 depart from the earlier view of Judge Taft in that they leave
the question of whether a state statute is a codification of the general
common law to the federal courts instead of to the state courts.
But the departure has not been universal. In a case in the second
circuit Judge Learned Hand declared; "We feel no hesitation in
finding, therefore, that when a state court, by a decision before the
critical facts occur, has purported to find in a state statute language
which is not intended merely to re-enact the common law, we are
conclusively bound whatever our own judgment as to the propriety
of their interpretation." 10 If accepted at all, the extension of the
doctrine of the Tyson case under question certainly should be taken
with this limitation.
"Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lane, 151 Fed. 276 (D. C. E. D. Ga. 1907).
'Capital City State Bank v. Swift, 290 F. 505 (D. C. D. Okla. 1923),
N. I. L., §§1 and 2 set forth the requisites of a negotiable instrument and what
constitutes certainty of sum.
'Bank of Massilon v. Mayfield, 71 Okla. 22, 174 Pac. 1034, 2 A. L. R.
135 (1918).
"Peterson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 19 F. (2d) 74 (D. C. S. D. Iowa
W. Div. 1926).
'See note 5, supra.
" Babbitt v. Read, 236 Fed. 42, (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
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There is a suggestion from the second circuit in a case involving
the construction of the Uniform Sales Act as adopted in New York
that as to a state statute codifying a part of the commercial law the
rule of compulsory conformity does not apply." But it was found
unnecessary in that case to decide the point.
On the other hand the Circuit Court of Appeals for the fourth
circuit has definitely decided in favor of conformity to state deci-
sions construing uniform laws in a case decided in 1925.12 The
question had arisen as to whether the maker of a check who hadnot
used sensitized paper or a protectograph in drawing the instrument,
which was later "raised," was liable for the raised amount to a holder
in due course. The case arose in North Carolina where the state
court had previously held in a similar case that the question of negli-
gence in drawing the check did not enter into the case under the
applicable section of the Negotiable Instrument Law (sec. 124, N.
C. C. S. 1919, sec. 3106) and thus that a holder in due course could
recover only according to the original tenor of the instrument. 3
Mr. Justice Hoke of the North Carolina Supreme Court asserted that
the Negotiable Instruments Law in this particular was in effect an
adoption of a rule of liability expounded in common law decisions.
In the case in the federal court the court followed the North Caro-
lina construction of the statute. Judge Waddill used this language
in his opinion (in referring to cases involving the construction of
state statutes): "In such cases, the interpretations placed by the
state's highest court upon its own statutes, passed within the inhibi-
tion of the Federal Constitution, will be accepted and followed,
although questions of commercial law and jurisprudence may be
involved or incidentally arise; and in a case like the present, where
the statute under review is a section of the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Act enacted in the interest of uniformity of commercial law
and decisions, and now in force in well nigh. all the states of the
Union, a federal court should be slow to attempt to maintain and
enforce its own ideas and understanding of such law, against the
"American Mfg. Co. v. U. S. Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Co., 7 F. (2d)
565 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925). The question was as to the effect of acceptance of
goods without giving notice of breach.
" Savings Bank of Richmond v. National Bank of Goldsboro, 3 F. (2d)
970, 39 A. L. R. 1374 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925). See RosE, FsmasA. PRocEDR.
(3rd ed. 1926) p. 524.
"Broad St. Bank v. National Bank of Goldsboro, 183 N. C. 463, 112 S. E.
11, 22 A. L. R. 1124 (1922), discussed in Note, (1924) 2 N. C. L. Rxv. 96. N.
I. L., §124 relates to the effect of alteration of a negotiable instrument.
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plain provisions thereof as construed by the highest court of the
state."
These cases indicate the status of the doctrine in the federal
courts. It is yet uncertain; there is want of uniformity among the
lower federal courts themselves on the question. It remains for
the Supreme Court to settle the matter.
The views of legal writers on the problem are also rather con-
flicting. Thus Professor Green of Illinois has concluded that "Since
federal courts sit as courts of the state administering a law of their
own jurisdiction, and not applying a foreign law, they possess what-
ever power a court has of establishing law by decision."' 14  On the
other hand we have this assertion from Professor Frankfurter of
Harvard: "Whenever the state law is authoritatively declared by the
state, either through legislation or adjudication, state laws ought to
govern state litigation, whether the forum of application is the state
or the federal court."' 15 And that writer has gone much farther in
urging the restoration to the states of exclusive jurisdiction of cases
of diverse citizenship.1 6 He has found the question to be one of
policy not determinable by a priori reasoning or fixed political prinj
ciples.
That the federal courts exercise some measure of the power
claimed for them by Professor Green is undoubtedly true. Thus
where the construction of the written law or the declaration of
the common law of a state comes up in a federal court before the
question has been ruled upon by the state court, the federal court
must of necessity rely upon its own judgment in the matter.17 And,
apart from considerations of legal theory,1 8 the doctrine of Sstdft v
Tyson as applied to common law questions is firmly established
in our system of jurisprudence. Quaere, are not the federal courts
on the equity side, tending in this direction now, by building upon
the uniformity of equity procedure a superstructure of uniform equity
jurisprudence ?19
"Green, The Law as Precedent, Prophecy, and Principle; State Decisions
in Federal Courts, (1924) 19 ILL. L. REv. 217, 223.
"Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Courts, The New Republic for Apr. 24,
1929, p. 273.
Ibid.
"Portneuf-Marsh Valley Canal Co. v. Brown, 274 U. S. 630, 47 S. Ct.
692 (1926).
"The writer has stated his conviction of the impropriety and fundamental
fallacy of the doctrine in an earlier number of this review. (1928) 7 N. C.
L. Rav. 48.
" See Clark v. Andrew, 11 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) ; Headley v.
Warmaltz, 111 So. 252 (Fla. 1926).
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On the other hand, it is equally clear that the federal courts
follow, as a matter of obligation,20 state court construction of state
statutes.21 There are variations from this rule which it is unneces-
sary to outline here.2 2 As late as 1926, Mr. Justice Holmes in speak-
ing for the Supreme Court said: "No case has yet gone the length
of undertaking to correct the construction of State laws by State
courts. The exclusive authority to enact these laws carries with it
final authority to say what they mean. The construction of these
laws -by the Supreme Court of the State is as much the act of the
State as the enactment of them by the Legislature." 23  This tends
to demonstrate that Professor Green's proposition, -whatever be its
merits as an abstraction, does not coincide with the facts of the prac-
tice in the federal courts. A most common form of judicial law-
making is that of adopting a new construction of a statute, and yet
the United States Supreme Court has held that it will abandon its
own former construction of a state statute in such a case in favor
of a new one by the state court as being binding upon it in the same
way that would be bound by a change in the statute itself.24 And
Jones v. Prairie Oil and Gas Co., 273 U. S. 195, 200, 47 S. Ct. 338, 71 L. Ed.
602 (1926) ; People of Sioux City, Neb. v. Nat'l Surety Co., 276 U. S. 238,
48 S. Ct. 239 (1928). But see note 22 infra.
= The cases are too numerous for citation here. See collection of cases.
28 U. S. C. A. §725, note 8. Likewise state courts follow federal construction
of federal statutes. Inge v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 192 N. C. 522, 135
S E. 522 (1926).
' Such as the decision in Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U. S. 175, 17 L. Ed. 520(1863), which, strangely enough, treats a change in state construction as a
change in the state law just as it would treat a statutory change. It was held
that the federal court would not follow a change in state construction where
rights of parties had accrued under the former construction, citing Ohio Life
Ins. and Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416 (1853). There is a further sugges-
tion in the case that the federal courts will always in exceptional cases dis-
regard state construction if opposed to their ideas of law and justice, which
has met with the approbation of Prof. Green. See his, The Law as Precedent,
Prophesy and Principle; State Decisions in Federal Courts, supra note 8.
' Jones v. Prairie Oil and Gas Co., supra note 20.
' Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Peters 291 (1832) ; approved in Wade v. Travis
County, 174 U. S. 508, 19 S. Ct. 718, 43 L. Ed. 1006 (1899). The following
expressions of Justice McLean in Green v. Neal merit quotation: "If the con-
struction of the highest judicial tribunal of a State form a part of its statute
law, as much as an enactment by the legislature, how can this court make a
distinction between them? There could be no hesitation in so modifying our
decisions as to conform to any legislative alteration in a statute; and why
should not the same rule apply where the judicial branch of the state govern-
ment in the exercise of its acknowledged functions, should by construction,
give a differenit effect to a statute from what had first been given to it. The
charge of inconsistency might be made with more force and propriety against
the federal tribunals for a disregard of this rule, than by conforming to it.
They profess to be bound by the local law; and yet they reject the exposition
of that law which forms a part of it."
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in a recent case before the Supreme Court it was held that that court
would reject the construction placed upon a state statute by the
federal court below in favor of the construction followed by the
state court, which had been arrived at since the entry of judgment
in the court below.2 5 These results must be considered as restricted
by, but not in conflict with, those important decisions of the Supreme
Court to the effect that as to rights arising after and depending upon
a former state construction of a state statute it will not be bound
by a change in the state construction of the statute.2 6
Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson should not
be applied in the construction of uniform state laws. It is required
neither by considerations of authority nor policy.
The consideration of authority is governed by section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which is still in force.2 7 It provides: "The
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties or
statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in courts of
the United States, in cases where they apply." Even Mr. Justice
Story in his opinion in Swift v. Tyson28 granted that this federal
statute applied to the positive statutes of a state and the construction
thereof adopted by the local tribunals. And, certainly, the federal
statute makes no distinction between statutes on local matters or
those changing the general commercial law and those codifying the
general commercial law. As recent researches by Charles Warren,
the historian of the Supreme Court, have revealed, 29 the whole doc-
trine of Swift v. Tyson probably violates the original import of the
federal statute; but even assuming that that statute applies only to
People of Sioux City, Neb. v. Nat'l. Surety Co., supra note 20.
- See note 20 supra. The same result has been reached where the first state
construction was made after the case arose in a federal court. Burgess v.
Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 27 L. Ed. 359 (1883); Carroll County v. Smith, 111
U. S. 556, 4 S. Ct. 542, 28 L. Ed. 519 (1884); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,
215 U. S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 140, 54 L. Ed. 228 (1910). Contra: U. S. v. Morri-
son, 4 Peters 124 (1830). And see Fidelity Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Kansas
City v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 47 S. Ct. 511, 71 L. Ed. 959 (1927), where the
Supreme Court followed the state construction of a Missouri statute since the
institution of the suit in the federal court in view of the fact that it effected
no change in the local law upon which the parties had relied. See also
People of Sioux City, Neb. v. Nat'l Surety Co., supra note 20.
28 U. S. C. A. §725.
's Supra note 1.
'Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act, supra
note 3, pp. 81-88. The writer concludes from a study of the senate files with
reference to the drafting of the section that it was intended to make state
decisions on common law questions rules of decision for the federal courts in
actions at common law.
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state statutory "laws," still it would apply to all state statutes appli-
cable to actions at common law in the federal courts.
Moreover, though it be granted that state court decisions constru-
ing state statutes are not literally a part of those statutes, it is quite
apparent that in the final analysis the courts do play a dominant part
in giving statutory law its content.30 Until the highest court of a
state has spoken, the significance of the less obvious statutes in par-
ticular, of that state is not finally settled. For all practical purposes
the statute is, before that time, no more than a prediction of what that
court will decide. And to hold that the phrase "laws of the several
states" in the federal statute does not extend to state court decisions
construing state laws would be to continue the error that the "laws"
of a state are not what they are understood to, be in the courts of
that state but what the federal courts say they are. The fundamental
importance of the functions of courts of last resort in settling the
law cannot be stressed too vigorously in this connection. al
This leaves the consideration of policy to be disposed of. If the
desirability of uniformity in matters of so called "general juris-
prudence," once a myth which the federal courts have converted into
a reality, be the real justification for the application of the doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson, does it exist vvith reference to the construction
of uniform state laws? Obviously, uniformity is the object most
desired in those enactments and uniform enactment without uniform
construction would be quite ineffectual in the attainment of that ob-
ject. This, of course, means uniform construction by the courts of
the states. Were the federal courts to construe such statutes as the
Negotiable Instruments Law independently of state decisions they
would effect uniformity in the federal courts as to all questions of
construction upon which the Supreme Court of the United States
had spoken but at most they could contribute little more than that to
the cause of uniformity. State courts are not likely to look to the
decisions of the federal Supreme Court to learn what construction
' W. W. Cook, loc. cit. supra note 4, 308. Speaking with reference to a
judge confronted with a case of first impression: "The case is by hypothesis
a new one. This means that there is no compelling reason of pure logic which
forces the judge to apply any one of the competing rules urged on him by
opposing counsel. His task is not to find the pre-existing but previously
hidden meaning of the terms in these rules; it is to give them a meaning."
This view applies with like force to construing statutes as to declaring the
common law.
't Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, (1928) 37
Y. L. Journ. 468, 479. "The ideal of a government of laws and not of men
is a dream which will have to wait for the time when law becomes calculus
to be realized".
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to place upon the laws of their respective states or to be brought in
line by any supposed moral pressure from federal decisions in gen-
eral.32  On the contrary many of them might be expected to resent
the pressure which arises from a departure by the federal courts from
the local construction.
The question remains whether this limited uniformity of con-
struction taken with the other consequences of independent federal
construction of uniform state laws is more desirable than the rule
of compulsory conformity to state construction. Already much of
American business is conducted on a nation-wide scale. And the
tendency is progressingly toward the more complete elimination of
state lines in the American business world. Looking to the future,
then, since diversity of citizenship giving federal courts jurisdiction
over controversies governed -by state law will no doubt be increas-
ingly prevalent in business transactions, independent federal construc-
ton of uniform state laws (of a commercial character at least) will
become increasingly desirable to big business units. On the other
hand local intra-state businesses still play a real part in our economic
life. Such units are interested in the local construction of state sta-
tutes of the character of the Negotiable Instruments Law. And it
may often be that a small town merchant will be on one end of a
transaction of sufficient size to give the federal courts jurisdiction
while a corporaton of another state doing a nation-wide business is
on the other. There, the case would be one subject to the jurisdiction
of the federal courts and one in which it probably would be to the
interest of one party that the state construction of the governing state
statute be followed and to the interest of the other that a uniform
federal construction be followed. This illustrates a conflict in in-
terest which the dual nature of our federal system is most ill-adapted
to adjust. Moreover, to have two rules of construction of the same
statute within the same state, a situation which would result inevit-
ably from the application of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson to the
interpretation of uniform state laws, would be very undesirable.8 3
Parties would naturally be inclined to attempt to throw a cause into
Thus the holding in Szwft v. Tyson, that a pre-existing debt constituted
value for purposes of making one a holder in due course was not adopted in
New York, where the case arose, and whose courts followed the old rule of
Bay v. Coddington, 29 Johns. 637 (1822), till the adoption of the N. I. L. in
1897 which follows the federal rule. And for some time thereafter the rule
was not clear in New York. It was the uniform state law movement that
brought New York in line and not pressure from the federal courts.
" It is true, of course, that this unhappy result has already followed in the
application of the doctrine to common law questions.
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whichever court, state or federal, followed the rule of construction
most favorable to them.3 4 It requires no further discussion to demon-
strate the evil of a system wherein the law of a state is one thing
in the federal courts and quite another in the state courts.
Consider the situation in North Carolina. A review of the cases
cited in Brannan5 reveals that the North Carolina Supreme Court
has adopted the minority construction of some six or more sections
of the Negotiable Instrument Law.36 Such variations in construction
are simply the expected thing where forty-eight highest courts ate
settling the matter with independent finality for as many distinct
jurisdictions. They suggest the futility of attempting to effect real
uniformity through the agency of the federal courts. Complete uni-
formity, or even substantial uniformity, cannot be achieved under
our present system unless the state courts are prepared to follow a
"This appears to be what happened in Black and White Taxicab Co. v.
Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U. S. 518, 48 S. Ct. 404 (1927), com-
mented upon in (1928) 38 Y. L. Journ. 88; (1928) 2 Sou. Cal. L. Rev. 80;
(1929) 7 Tex. L. Rev. 283; (1928) 7 N. C. L. Rev. 48.
BRANNAN'S NEGOTIAmr IxsTRUmENTs LAW ANiOTATED (4th edition) by
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 1926).
" Probably the most important North Carolina variation is the holding that
notwithstanding §51 of the N. I. L. (N. C. C. S. 1919, §3032) an agent for
collection though the holder of an instrument cannot sue on it in his own
name because not the real party in interest. First Nat'l Bank of Columbus,
Ga. v. Rochamora, 193 N. C. 1, 136 S. E. 259 (1926). There is split of authority
as to burden of proof of consideration for a negotiable instrument. North
Carolina has taken the view that it is on defendant under §28 of the N. I. L.
(N. C. C. S. 1919, § 3009). North Carolina holds that the mere possession of
an unindorsed instrument is prima facie evidence of ownership as against the
maker. Hayes'v. Green, 187 N. C. 776, 123 S. E. 7 (1924). This appears
to be against the weight of authority. Brannan, op. cit., supra note 35, at page
342. It is held in North Carolina that a transferee without indorsement, not-
withstanding the N. I. L. §49 (N. C. C. S., 1919, §3030) acquires only the
equitable title to the instrument plus a right to have an indorsement. Crichter
v. Ballard, 180 N. C. 111, 104 S. E. 134 (1920). A later case cites Brannan's
criticism of this view but does not abandon it. Planters' Bank and Trust Co. v.
Yelverton, 185 N. C. 314, 117 S. E. 299 (1923). It is held in North Carolina
that as between himself and the indorsee an indorser can show by parol an
agreement varying the contract ordinarily implied by his indorsement. Sykes
v. Everett, 167 N. C. 600, 83 S. E. 585 (1914) ; McRae v. Fox. 185 N. C. 343,
117 S. E. 396 (1923). It is said in (1924) 2 N. C. L. REv. 123, citing (1919),
4 A. L. R. 764 that twenty-eight states and the federal courts exclude such evi-
dence. The applicable statute is N. I. L. §66 (N. C. C. S. 1919, §3047). The
majority view under §119 of the N. I. L. (N. C. C. S. 1919, §3101) is that a
plea that one of the makers of the note to the knowledge of the payee-holder
signed as surety only and had been discharged by an extension of time by
payee to the principal debtor is bad. Brannan, op. cit., supra note 35, at p. 721.
The North Carolina court has suggested that such a plea when supported by
proof would be good. Robertson v. Spain, 173 N. C. 23, 91 S. E. 361 (1917).
The North Carolina view as to the question.of negligence under the N. I. L.
§124 (N. C. C. S. 1919, §3106) has already appeared in the text of this paper.
See Broad St. Bank v. National Bank of Goldsboro, supra note 13.
432 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
uniform construction of their own laws laid down by the courts of the
nation, a thing utterly out of the question. And any permanent solu-
tion of the problem that might come about through a change in our
political structure is too remote and unlikely to warrant speculation.
It is 'believed, therefore, that as a solution of the immediate prob-
lem the rule of compulsory conformity on the part of federal courts
to the state construction of uniform state laws should be followed.
